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TORT LIABILITY FOR RADIATION INJURIES
E. BLYTHE STASON*

The discovery that atomic chain reaction will produce substantial
quantities of heat together with highly radioactive by-products gives
rise to anticipation of an entirely new technology and of many new
lines of industrial, medical, and agricultural endeavor. In due course
widespread use will be made of the potentialities of this new source
of energy.
At the same time the likelihood of personal and property injuries
resulting from overexposure to radiation brings about a new hazard
against which protection must be afforded so far as it is possible to do
so. The health and safety codes that are now being formulated at national, state and local levels all bear witness to the hazards of the
business and the desire of public authorities to minimize them so far
as possible. However, notwithstanding such precautions, it is only
realistic to assume that the atomic age will bring with it some unique
types of injury resulting from overexposure to alpha, beta, and gamma radiation and other hazards connected with the fission of the
atom. In this paper I shall survey the principal doctrines, laws, and
suggested enactments in so far as they bear upon the civil liability of
reactor operators, isotope users, product manufacturers, and others
who may be responsible for injuries occasioned by radiation.
At the outset we should examine briefly the wide range of possibilities of radiation injury, for this wide range in and of itself has
an important bearing upon the shape which the law will take in
this unique area.
Nuclear accidents may involve only minor incidents, consisting
perhaps of no more than a slight overexposure of a single individual
with no serious damage resulting therefrom. On the other hand, however, accidents may range in size and severity up to and including vast
devastating affairs with widespread damage to persons and property,
involving very large sums, even larger than the financial capacity of
the largest of our corporations. Moreover, accidents may result from
rather commonplace, routine, and normally quite safe operations, such
as the use of radioisotopes as tracers in medical diagnosis, or they
may arise from undertakings of a unique and hazardous character,
calling for all of the ingenuity of modern science and engineering to
provide essential safety for the public. Again, as to location, accidents
may take place in the relatively unpopulated areas of the country, or
they may result from activities located close to centers of population
where industrial activity is most likely to be carried on.
* Dean,
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With respect to the injuries themselves, they may take a variety
of forms which in themselves will have effect upon tort liability,
particularly on questions of evidence, damages, and statutes of limitation. Short of fatality, injuries may include such serious afflictions
as cancer, cataract, leukemia, and genetic damage. Somewhat less
serious could be the shortening of the life span, damage to the bone
marrow, superficial burns, loss of hair, and psychosomatic effects
resulting from fear and anxiety. Property injuries may involve expense of decontamination, loss of use for a period of time, or even
complete destruction of all useful value.
Also bearing on the question of tort liability will be the nature of
the operation from which the radiation emanates. The facility may
be an atomic power plant or fuel processing plant in which large
quantities of fissionable material are kept on hand, quantities sufficient if placed in the proper configuration to result in chain reactions
and widespread effects. Or, on the other hand, the user may be a
private industry utilizing small quantities of radioisotopes for industrial purposes. The party responsible may be a supplier of component
parts or materials for atomic facilities, or the activity may be a university laboratory or some other research organization. All of these and
probably many other possibilities must be kept in mind as we attempt
to analyze the problem of tort liability connected with radiation
injuries.
It is fortunately true that, up to the present time, atomic industry
has proved to be remarkably safe. There have been a few accidents
in critical facilities; the NRX reactor at Chalk River "ran away" and
the countryside was more or less contaminated; a control rod test
incident took place at the Argonne Laboratories resulting in substantial overexposure of four members of the staff; Borax No. 1 ran away
at Arco, and EBR-1 did likewise. There has been one incident involving overexposure in connection with industrial radiography, and in
recent months we have read about the "Windscale accident" at one
of Great Britain's plutonium producing reactors located in Cumberland. Although this accident resulted in contamination of milk
supplies in the vicinity, there was no known personal damage and
full compensation has been made for the damaged milk which was
duly discharged into the sea. Notwithstanding these incidents which
do in fact indicate the potentialities of the business, we may properly
conclude that atomic industry has proved itself to be safe for those
who work in the plants and for those who live in the vicinity.1
1. See A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving Radiation In
Atomic Energy Activities, June, 1945 through December, 1955, by Daniel F.
Hayes, Safety and Fire Protection Board, Division of Organization and Personnel, U.S.A.E.C., available from the Office of Technical Services, Department of
Commerce, Washington, D. C.
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There has been but little actual case law involving radiation injuries. The most highly publicized and dramatic case concerned the
radium dial painters of New York, LaPorte v. United States Radium
2
Corporation.
In this case the decedent had been employed for approximately a year and a half painting watch dials with radioactive luminous paint. She had been following the common practice of pointing
the bristles of the paint brush with her lips, thereby ingesting small
quantities of radioactive material. Twelve years after she left the
company she began to exhibit symptoms of radium necrosis. She
commenced an action for damages and shortly thereafter she died.
The action was revived by her legal representative.
There was a two-year statute of limitations. The action actually
took the form of a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations as a bar. This action was dismissed. Because of the statute, the plaintiff was unable to recover damages. In
view of the significance of the case as a forerunner of litigation resulting from radiation accidents a more detailed review of the circumstances seems desirable.
The decedent had been employed by the defendant between May,
1917 and December, 1918. She worked with about 80 other girls in a
large factory room ventilated by a skylight and by windows which
were regulated by the girls as they saw fit. There were no special
methods or scientific devices for ventilation. Consequently a certain
amount of radioactive dust in the workroom was undoubtedly
absorbed by breathing, this being in addition to absorption through the
mouth.
The evidence revealed *some interesting early history of radiation
injury. As early as 1917 many dangers to the human body from radiation and radium emanation were recognized by scientific experts.
Long exposure to irradiation and x-ray had resulted fatally among a
few technicians and scientists. As early as 1914 an article had been
published in Germany entitled "Concerning Occupational Injuries Due
to Radioactive Substances," and in 1916 another similar article entitled
"Occupational Diseases Due to Radium; Report of Cases" had been
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Notwithstanding these researches, there was no question but that the
defendant, The United States Radium Corporation, was utterly ignorant of the harmful effects attendant upon its factory processes until
1924 when its attention was directed to a case of radium necrosis suffered by one of its former employees. At that time the company had
examinations made of several of its employees, but the examining
agency reported that there was no other evidence showing damage.
2. 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935).
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According to some of the literature produced in evidence, prior to
1925 or thereabouts, although there were suggestions in the literature of hazards from radium, many persons actually hailed it as a boon
to humanity, and its internal use by injection, inhalation, etc., were
frequently advocated. The court voiced an interesting observation
with respect to the standard of care to be imposed upon the defendant
as follows:
It is tempting in the light of knowledge of today [i.e., 1935] and the
experience since 1920 to create the thought that the defendant must have
been negligent in some way. Today, industrial methods which the defendant then employed would not be merely negligent but criminal. But
it should be carefully noted that this case must be decided on the facts
as they existed in the light of the knowledge of 1917 to 1920. Were safety
measures such as scientific ventilation, masks, periodical medical examinations, abolition of brush pointing, and other now known precautions
to be considered necessary as of 1920?
Actually, the defendant and its research bureau failed to anticipate
what later research and scientific investigation proved to be a fact,
namely, that the defendant's dial painters in 1920 were exposed to the
gravest of dangers in their occupation.
The fact is that this experience was not brought home to science and
medicine until a considerable number of cases such as that at bar had been
considered and then the knowledge came slowly, only to be accepted
as fact several years after the first necrosis cases were exposed. 3
Further said the court:
On the contrary, the court is constrained to find that in 1920 and up to
1924, in which time the two-year period of limitations would have elapsed,
there was neither knowledge of an occupational hazard in the dial-painting
industry nor, in the light of the knowledge concerning radium, reason for
the defendant to believe or to have known of the hazard. The defendant
could not have been under a duty to4 disclose a hazard which, so far as
it or the world knew, did not exist.
Accordingly the court held that the plaintiff's request for an injunction to prevent the pleading of the statute of limitations on the ground
of "equitable fraud" on the part of the defendant could not be sustained and the bill was dismissed.
From our present point of view the LaPorte case is interesting on
several grounds. In the first place, the company was not confronted
with a doctrine of strict liability, which, as we shall see, will figure
importantly in radiation cases. In the second place, the standard of
care required in connection with determining negligence did not
compel the defendant to engage in advanced research to ascertain
the hazards inherent in his industrial processes. He discharged his
duty of care by acting with reasonable prudence in accordance with
3. Id. at 271.
4. Id. at 275.
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common knowledge of his time. He was not obliged to govern his
actions according to facts that might have been disclosed by intensive
research beyond the limits of current common knowledge.
This principle has an important and obvious application to the
processes of industrial utilization of the atom with respect to which
so much still remains either undiscovered or, at least, is not currently
of common knowledge. We must always be conscious of the fact that
tomorrow's discoveries may teach us that today's practices are unduly
hazardous to persons and property. Yet the operator in the atomic
field cannot be expected to be aware of the revelations of the future.
On the other hand he cannot safely close his eyes to the contemporary
revelations of research. He must be up to date, and if he is really
wise, he will keep a careful eye on the future as well.
CURRENT THEoImEs OF LIABILITY
There are three principal theories of tort liability applicable to
radiation injuries. They are negligence, nuisance, and strict liability,
the latter sometimes being called liability without fault.
Negligence has been defined as "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage,"5 or, in different terms,
conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonably great risk of harm. '6 Conduct falls short of this standard when the individual against whom
the charge of negligence is made has failed to act as the reasonable
man of ordinary prudence would act under similar circumstances. The
standard is an objective one rather than one based upon personal
judgment of the particular individual. Negligence as a legal basis
for imposing liability emerged as a judicial doctrine after the Industrial Revolution, departing from the more primitive concepts of the
earlier common law. Over the last century or more it has developed
into the widespread and omnipresent theory of liability applicable to
most forms of human activity and enterprise.
Nuisance, or at least "private nuisance," as commonly understood is
"a term applied to unreasonable interference with the interest of an
individual in the use or enjoyment of land."'7 The interference may be
either intentional or negligent, or it may result from an abnormally
dangerous activity for which strict liability is imposed. According to
Dean Prosser, liability for nuisance must "result from conduct -of the
defendant which is found to be unreasonable in the light of its utility
and the harm or risk which results. ' 8 According to some authorities,
5. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
6. 2 RE STATEN=T, ToRTs § 282 (1934).
7. See PROSSER, ToRTs 389 (2d ed. 1955).

8. Id. at 389.
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the conduct giving rise to nuisance liability must be either tortious or

criminal in addition to interfering with the use of the land of another.9
However, the courts have in fact by their decisions broadened the
concept to include acts causing damage to the property of others that
are neither tortious or criminal in the ordinary sense.
Strict liability is the third and probably the most significant theory
demanding consideration in connection with radiation injuries. Something like strict liability was originally the rule of the common law,
but it was replaced during the years of the Industrial Revolution by
the doctrine of negligence. Today the pendulum is swinging back
again, and it is accurate to say that there is a strong trend in the
direction of developing a policy of strict liability embracing an everincreasing area of industrial activity. This is particularly true when
injuries arise out of activities involving unusual danger to persons and
property in the community. The operator who carries on such a
dangerous activity in a community where harm is likely to result to
individuals can be deemed by that very fact to be guilty of committing
a fault, or in any event it can be said, as certain courts have in fact
said, that the person who carries on such activities should be obliged
to pay the damages resulting therefrom in order that such activities
shall "pay their way." This doctrine of strict liability then becomes a
measure of social expediency.
These then are the primary doctrines of the common law related
to the subject of our inquiry.
LiAn.ITY OF REACTOR OPERATORS

We may now ask ourselves the question: What liability is likely
to be imposed upon reactor operators and others engaged in handling
fissionable materials in critical quantities? Will it be absolute liability
for all injuries occasioned by their activities, or at least for all injuries
resulting from chain reactions? Or will liability be limited in whole
or in part to responding in damages for injuries caused by negligence
which is duly alleged and proved by the plaintiff?
(a) The Doctrineof Rylands v. Fletcher
Every student of the common law is familiar with the case of
Rylands v. Fletcher0 decided by the English courts in 1868 announcing a rule of absolute liability against an operator who "brings on his
land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes." In this instance a mill owner built a water reservoir on his
9. E.g., Seavey, Nuisance, Contributory Negligence, and other Mysteries, 65

IIARv. L. REv. 984 (1952). The American Law Institute Restatement of Torts,
follows Prosser rather than Seavey; see RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, Scope Note to
ch. 40 (1939).
10. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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land over an abandoned mine shaft that, unknown to him, connected
with a mine located on the plaintiff's adjoining premises. The water
accumulated in the reservoir and thereafter escaped into and through
the abandoned shaft into the plaintiff's workings. The House of
Lords with Lord Cairns speaking, said:
If, in what I may term the natural user of the land, there had been any
accumulation of water .... the Plaintiff could not have complained ....
On the other hand, if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural user of
their close, had desired to use for any purpose which I may term a nonnatural use .... and if in consequence... the water came to escape and
to pass off into the close of the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that
which the Defendants were doing, they were doing at their own peril."1
In accordance with this opinion three points have emerged in the
application of the Rylands doctrine; namely (1) liability is imposed
only in case of bringing on to the land a dangerous substance likely
to cause mischief, (2) this activity must be a "non-natural" use of the
land, and (3) there must be an "escape" that causes damage. The
vague character of these limitations has resulted in much uncertainty
in the application of the doctrine.
One of the leading British legal writers, Dr. Stallybrass, addressed
himself to the first of these points, i.e., the dangerous character of the
substance, in the following words:
The principle of law behind all these cases is, it is submitted, that if a
man takes a risk which he ought not to take without also taking upon
his shoulders the consequences of that risk, he shall pay for any damage
that ensues. In every case the question really is: was the risk one which
the defendant was entitled to take only on a condition of paying compensation to those injured there, irrespective of any negligence on his part?
And the answer to that question will not depend on whether the thing
in question was dangerous per se but upon whether it was dangerous
12
in the circumstances of the particular case.
Is the doctrine of the Rylands case to be applied to radiation injuries
resulting from reactor operations-or to some of them, and, if so, to
which ones? Is it also to be applied to other operators who keep on
hand critical quantities of fissionable materials, e.g., fuel processing
and re-processing plants? It is clear that the application to the widely
variant specific situations will present difficulties.
The English courts have adhered to the doctrine in a considerable
variety of cases involving some seventy English decisions, and naturally, the principle has been carried from England to the United States
where it has been given consideration by most of the state supreme
courts. It is a doctrine which has an obvious application to nuclear
11. Id. at 339.
12. Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3
CAMB. L.J. 376, 387 (1929).
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reactors, for the reactor owner and operator certainly brings to his
premises something which is "likely to do mischief if it escapes."
Moreover, it is not too extreme to characterize the reactor as a "nonnatural user" of the premises. Therefore, the doctrine of Rylands v.
13
Fletcher would seem to be directly pertinent.
Turning, however, to the American decisions involving the doctrine
we find not a little conflict of view. The doctrine was early repudiated
by the supreme courts of New York, 14 New Hampshire, 5 and New
Jersey,16 and throughout the years it has been repudiated, by name at
least, in nine additional states, namely, Kentucky, Maine, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. On the other
hand, an even greater number of American courts have accepted the
doctrine and applied it in one way or another, thus following the
lead of early decisions by the supreme courts of Massachusetts and
Minnesota.' 7 Decisions applying it have been rendered in Arkansas,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia. 18 It would appear that in the United States the doctrine has met
with far more favor than otherwise.
The doctrine has been applied to a wide variety of cases. It has
been applied to the storing of explosives and inflammable liquids, to
blasting, fumigating, crop dusting, to oil well operations, and to the
emission of smoke, dust, or noxious gases.
On the other hand, courts have declined to apply the doctrine to
more conventional activities notwithstanding the minor hazards involved. For example, they have declined to apply it to cases involving
injury occasioned by water in water mains, gas in household supply
devices, electric wiring, gasoline in filling stations, steam boilers, and
other activities which are deemed more normal and natural in relation to the location where they are carried on and the purposes they
fulfill.
It is a fact, moreover, that certain courts have declined to apply
Rylands v. Fletcher in cases that have involved situations of an unusually hazardous character but which are not out of line with the
economy and the customs of the country. Such a case is Turner v. Big
Lake Oil Company.19 This case involved oil producing operations in
Texas where such operations play a very large part in the economy.
13. For citation of many English cases, see PROSSER, TORTS 329, 330 (2d
ed. 1955).

14.
15.
16.
17.

Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868); Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871).

18. The cases are exhaustively collected in

LAW OF TORTS 152-57 (1953).

19. 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).

PROSSER, SELECTED

ToPxcs
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Turner brought suit against the oil company relying on both negligence and strict liability claiming damages for pollhtion of his land
and water holes. He alleged that the defendants permitted salt water
to escape from oil producing operations on their property. The jury
found that the defendants were not guilty of negligence and the court
as a matter of law refused to apply a doctrine of strict liability. The
opinion indicated that the court was affected in large measure by the
importance of the oil producing business to the economy of the state
of Texas.
On the other hand, in almost the same year, in the nearby state of
Kansas, a more predominately agricultural state, the supreme court
held exactly the contrary in the case of Berry v. Shell Petroleum Company.20 This also was an action for damages to real property caused
by the seepage of salt water thereby ruining the water supply on the
plaintiff's property. The salt water came from the operations of an
oil producing field. The plaintiff placed reliance upon the doctrine of
absolute liability making no allegations of negligence. The court held
the defendants liable. It first spoke in terms of nuisance for which the
plaintiffs were entitled to maintain an action at law for damages on
account of special injuries sustained by them. Then the court referred
and relied upon Rylands v. Fletcher saying that negligence is not a
necessary element of recovery in such cases. "We are aware of the
fact," said the court, "that such a ruling places a great burden upon
the oil industry. It is, however, no new principle which we are
announcing. It is old as the industry of man. We consider that the
water supply of the people is of greater importance than the operation of a business at a reduced cost." Thus the nature of the economy
of the area becomes an important if not a controlling factor in applying the Rylands doctrine and a principle of relative social utility
emerges.
We should also refer to one other case of considerable significance:
m2
Green v. General Petroleum Corporation.
In this case the plaintiffs
instituted an action to recover damages for injuries to their property
occasioned by the defendant's oil drilling operations. It appeared that
in the process of drilling for oil on his own premises, although the
defendant had exercised reasonable care and was not guilty of negligence in any way, a stream of oil, gas, mud, and rocks shot into the
air and onto the plaintiff's property located about two hundred feet
from the operations. The defendant denied liability asserting that
under the California decisions there was no such thing as liability
without negligence. The court agreed that the discovery and production of oil is a legitimate and lawful business and is not a nuisance
20. 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934).

21. 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928).
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per se. Nevertheless, the court held the defendant liable for damages.
The precise theory of liability is not carefully stated, but the court
said that one must so use his own land as not to cause injury to another. Without referring to Rylands v. Fletcher,the court stated the
applicable rule under the California law as follows:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and
proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions and,
with knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury
is done to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act,
however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury
should in all fairness, be required to compensate the other for the damage
done. The instant case offers a most excellent example of an actual in22
vasion of property of one person through the act of another.
Although the court does not make it clear whether liability is
based upon a theory of trespass (because of the actual invasion of the
plaintiff's premises), or nuisance, or strict liability along the line of
Rylands v. Fletcher,it was clear nevertheless that the defendant was
compelled to respond in damages. A reactor owner would doubtless
be in a similarly vulnerable position, or, perhaps, even more so because he could be charged with bringing onto his premises the
substances that have escaped and caused harm.
(b) The American Law Institute Restatement Doctrine
There is another basis of possible strict liability of reactor operators
which should be mentioned. The American Law Institute Restatement
of Torts has dealt with the subject, enunciating the pertinent tort doctrine in the following terms:
§519 Miscarriage of UltrahazardousActivities Carefully Carried On. Except as stated in paragraph 521-4 one who carries on an ultrahazardous
activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor
should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto, from that which makes
the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to
prevent the harm.
§520 Definition of UltrahazardousActivity. An activity is ultrahazardous
if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land
or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the
23
utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage.
We must ask ourselves whether or not the Restatement doctrine is
likely to be applied by the courts to atomic reactors or to other
facilities that aggregate critical quantities of fissionable materials.
Should we conclude that such operations "necessarily involve a risk
of serious harm which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the
utmost care"? Or, on the other hand, may we argue with good reason
22. Id. at 955.
23. See 3 RESTATEMENT,

TORTS

§ 520 (1938).
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that reactors may some day become "matters of common usage,"
whatever that term may mean? The Restatement doctrine was not
formulated until 1938 and thus far only a very few cases have been
decided in which it has been interpreted and applied. In California,
for example, the courts seem to have adopted the rule, possibly for the
reason that they have in at least three cases expressed disapproval of
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, and they are seeking some basis for
granting relief in proper cases.
In a recent opinion in Luthringer v. Moore24 the California court
imposed strict liability, relying squarely on the rule. In that case the
defendant was hired to fumigate the basement of a restaurant neither
owned nor occupied by him. The plaintiff was employed by a pharmacist whose shop was located in an adjacent building. The hydracyanic
acid gas which was used for fumigation seeped into the pharmacist
shop and caused injury to the plaintiff. He brought action for damages. The court, citing the Restatement, found that the defendant's
activity was "ultrahazardous," that it was not a "matter of common
usage," and, therefore, that the plaintiff should be held absolutely
liable regardless of negligence.
The courts in a few other states have also relied upon the Restatement rule. In Bedell v. Goulter25 the Oregon Supreme Court relied
upon it in a case involving injuries to real property caused by concussion and vibration from blasting operations. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reached a similar result in Federoff v. HarrisonConstruction Company,26 also a blasting case. Another blasting case with
a similar result was decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in
Whitman Hotel Corporation v. The Elliott & Watrous Engineering
Company.27
On the other hand there have been courts in at least three other
states that have considered but rejected a request for application of
the Restatement doctrine to the particular cases at hand. In Smith v.
Okerson28 the New Jersey court declined to apply the Restatement
rule. The case involved the spraying of an alfalfa crop, it appearing
that some of the arsenic solution was carried by the wind to the
plaintiff's adjoining fields. In a Delaware case, Fritz v. E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co.29 the Delaware court declined to apply the doctrine
in a case involving escaping chlorine fumes. Again, in Midwest Oil
Company v. City of Aberdeen 3 the South Dakota Supreme Court, in
24.
25.
26.
27.

31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842 (1953).
362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949).
137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).

28. 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857 (1950).

29. 45 Del. (6 Terry) 412, 75 A.2d 256 (1950).
30. 69 S. D. 343, 10 N.W.2d 701 (1943).
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the absence of proof of negligence, declined to hold the defendant city
liable under the Restatement doctrine for damages inflicted upon the
plaintiff's gasoline filling station by a break in the city's water main.
The court did not regard a water main as "an ultrahazardous activity."
We may say, therefore, that the doctrine of the American Law Institute Restatement has not yet been widely applied although it is a
worthy attempt to achieve precision and definiteness in the field of
absolute liability. It is certain that the doctrine will be resorted to by
the plaintiffs in the event a nuclear reactor or other critical facility
goes awry and causes damage.
(c) Nuisance as a Remedy for Radiation Injuries
In order to complete the review of American doctrines involving or
related to absolute or strict liability we must give brief consideration
to a considerable group of cases disposed of either wholly or in part
under the law of private nuisance. Of especial interest is a doctrine
that has been developed which for want of a better name has often
been called "absolute nuisance," or "nuisance per se."
In general, a private nuisance may result whenever there is an interference with the use or enjoyment of the land of the plaintiff
occasioned either by the intentional misconduct of the defendant, or
conduct which is negligent, or conduct with respect to which the courts
are inclined to apply strict liability without proof of either intent or
negligence. It is this third category with which we are primarily
concerned. A nuisance case normally is disposed of by a petition in
equity in which the plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain the
defendant and perhaps asks damages as well. However, the decisions
reveal that the courts of law also, in actions in which damages alone
are sought, frequently refer to nuisance principles and apply them in
reaching the conclusion that the circumstances call for the imposition
of the equivalent of absolute liability.
In considering the possible relation of nuisance doctrines to liability
for radiation injuries we should take account of two classes of cases.
The first includes cases in which the defendant intentionally maintains
an activity in a neighborhood where in normal operation it causes
annoyance or injury to occupants of property in the vicinity, e.g., the
operation of a plant that gives off sulphuric acid fumes, or, in the
atomic field, possibly radioactive gases. The second class covers cases
of unduly hazardous operations which, in normal and successful
operation cause no harm whatsoever, but if an accident takes place
trouble ensues, e.g., storage of nitroglycerin, or, in the atomic field,
operating a reactor or a fuel processing plant. The courts have evolved
and apply a "balance of convenience" doctrine to both types of cases,
with the result that no nuisance is found and no liability is imposed,
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apart from negligence, if the activity is reasonable in relation to its
location, its proximity to population, its economic worth and other
related factors. If otherwise, however, the court will enjoin or will
give judgment for damages, or will afford both such remedies as the
equities may require. It is apparent that such a doctrine will embrace
many cases that would fall within the scope of Rylands v. Fletcher as
currently interpreted, and therefore the two doctrines are concurrent
in effect to a considerable degree. Some courts use the two doctrines
interchangeably, or perhaps both in the same opinion. Doubtless
defendants in radiation accident cases will encounter this doublebarrelled approach with considerable frequency in the years to come.
For example, we have previously referred to the case of Berry v. Shell
Petroleum Company,31 an action for damages in which the court based
its conclusion of absolute liability both upon a theory of nuisance and
also upon the precedent of Rylands v. Fletcher. Many such cases
could be cited.
It is also apparent that many courts which purport to reject the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher do in fact reach like conclusions under
the name of absolute nuisance. As stated by Professor Prosser:
There is in fact no case applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is not reasonably duplicated in all essential respects by some American decision
which proceeds on the theory of nuisance. 32
A wealth of authority could be cited in support of the foregoing
statement, but the following will serve as illustrative and typical
cases. In none of them was there showing of either negligence or
wrongful intent. In Longtin v. Persellm the plaintiff recovered damages in an action involving use of explosives producing vibrations
which were held to constitute an actionable nuisance; in Holman v.
Mineral Point Zinc Co.3 the plaintiff was refused an injunction but
was awarded damages in an action to abate as a nuisance and to
recover damages for losses caused by defendant's plant emitting sulphuric acid fumes; and in Bartell v. Ridgefield Lumber Co.35 the
plaintiff also recovered damages but was denied an injunction asked
by him to prevent the operation of defendant's sawmill which emitted
sparks, smoke, and soot. Other cases that might be cited involve
percolating water, storage of explosives, fireworks, oil wells, mining
operations, the accumulation of sewage, and bad odors, noxious gases,
smoke, dust, etc. In other words, the cases in which American courts
have resorted to an absolute nuisance doctrine as the basis of strict
liability cover much the same territory as that covered by cases
31. 140 Kan. 94, 33 P.2d 953 (1934).
32. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics IN THE LAW OF TORTS 170 (1953).
33. 30 Mont. 306, 76 Pac. 699 (1904).
34. 135 Wis. 132, 115 N.W. 327 (1908).
35. 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306 (1924).
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directly based upon Rylands v. Fletcher and the doctrines developed
thereunder.3
As these cases have developed, however, there would seem to be
at least one important difference between Rylands v. Fletcher and the
doctrines of nuisance. The Rylands theory focuses primarily upon the
"dangerous nature" of the instrumentality, and if it escapes and "does
mischief," strict liability is imposed without further question. On
the other hand, the nuisance doctrine, in accord with the general
approach of courts of equity Where most of the cases arise, is more
likely to produce decisions based upon a balance of public convenience
or a balance of interest between the plaintiff and the defendant. The
court of equity has discretionary authority, particularly (although
not exclusively) used in connection with issuing the injunction. Intangible factors, including, among others, a high measure of social
utility or economic value, may serve to exculpate an activity that
otherwise would be deemed a private nuisance. The fact that the
strict liability cases which we are now considering normally (although
not always) have arisen in courts of equity has given rise to the idea
of balancing of equities. It should be observed that this element not
only serves to mitigate undue hardship, which is good, but also it
serves to create a decidedly vague and indeterminate standard to be
applied in the field under consideration. Under such a theory the lines
of demarcation between strict liability and otherwise become shadowy
indeed.
In any event it is clear that, in disposing of cases involving injuries
occasioned by reactors or other critical facilities, the courts will be
involved in applying one or perhaps all of the three doctrines heretofore mentioned, i.e.,-Rylands v. Fletcher,the American Law Institute
Restatement, and nuisance. The owners and operators will stand but
little chance of escaping strict liability.
LiABiLTY

OF OPERATORS OF LESS HAZARDOUS
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Reactor operators do not stand alone as possible sources of radiation
injuries. Other possible defendants include those who use radioactive
isotopes for radiography, for thickness measurements, in tracers, in
medical diagnosis and therapy, in biological and agricultural experiments, in irradiation of food and drugs, in the use of wear-testing
devices, and in dozens of other highly useful applications, either currently in use or envisaged for the near future. These uses of atomic
energy are widespread at the present time and are increasing at a very
rapid rate. They have enormous economic value and have become a
36. Many other cases are cited in PROSSER, SELECTED Topics
166-71 (1953).
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more or less normal part of our industrial life. Nevertheless, they
involve some unique hazards. Shall we treat such uses as a normal
part of our existence, subject to the normal rules applicable to other
types of injuries arising in connection with industrial activity? Or
shall we apply the strict liability principles sketched in the earlier
portion of this article?
The answer to this question cannot be given on the basis of direct
precedent, but it is suggested by the many dozens of cases that have
been decided by American courts in connection with the use of x-ray
machines.37 Persons undergoing examination or treatment by means
of these machines run two primary dangers: the danger of harm
from the x-rays themselves and the danger of harm from the powerful
electric currents necessary to produce the rays. In case of injury
arising from either of these dangers it is uniformly held that the
general principles of the law applicable to other injuries caused by
physicians and surgeons shall be utilized. Accordingly a medical
practitioner is bound only to exercise reasonable skill and care in his
patient's behalf. He is liable only for negligence and is not held
strictly liable for x-ray injuries inflicted on his patients. Moreover,
the plaintiff's right of recovery on a theory of negligence for x-ray
injuries is contingent upon proof of proximate causation, an element
not always easy to establish. In passing it may be noted that a proximate cause defense frequently asserted by physicians from whom
recovery for injuries by x-rays is sought is that the cause of injuries
was not the negligence of the physician but instead the unusual and
unpredictable susceptibility of the patient to harm from exposure to
x-rays. This is an issue quite likely to arise in connection with radiation accidents. In addition, the broad rules of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are applicable to x-ray cases, as are the rules
concerning the burden of proof. In short, in connection with x-ray
injuries we apply the negligence doctrine in all of its facets, as distinguished from the doctrine of strict liability.
There is no reason to suppose that the use of radioactive isotopes
for medical purposes will result in different standards of liability
from those applied in the case of x-ray machines. The hazard is comparable, and the extent of usage is growing by leaps and bounds.
Moreover, it is altogether likely that most of the other uses of radioactive material above referred to, e.g., radiography, thickness measuring guages, etc., will be similarly treated. Their normality will be
accepted, and they will be subjected only to the standards of due care
prescribed with respect to other industrial mishaps, in connection
with which proof of negligence is required.
37. See the many cases cited in 41 A.L.R.2d 329 (1955).
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LIABILITY OF PRODUCT MANUFACTURERS
IN THE ATOMIC FIELD

It is a fact that the possibility of this type of liability is going to
assume substantial proportions in connection with atomic affairs.
Manufacturers will inevitably be brought into court to respond to
claims for damages for alleged injuries resulting from component parts
of reactors fabricated by them, and devices produced by them making
use of radioactive products, and sold on the market for industrial,
medical, and other uses. Will such manufacturers be subjected to
strict liability or will liability ensue only in the event the plaintiff
succeeds in proving negligence?
Every lawyer is familiar with the New York case, MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Company.38 The plaintiff was injured when a wheel
collapsed on a car manufactured by the defendant company. The car
had been purchased by the plaintiff through a dealer. Although the
wheel came to the defendant from a supplier, the defect was such
that reasonable inspection would have disclosed it. The defendant
was held liable for negligence, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no so-called "privity of contract" between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The liability in other words was based not upon contractual
but upon tort principles, with the court expounding a duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff in the following terms:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, then it is a thing of danger....
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests,
then, irrespective of contract the manufacturer of this thing of danger
is under a duty to make it carefully.39
Since this decision in 1916 the scope of manufacturer's liability for
injuries occasioned by his products, not only to immediate purchasers
but also to remote purchasers or even to strangers who may be injured
has been constantly broadened by court decisions.
The Buick case involved injury caused by a negligently manufactured chattel. More recent cases have made it clear that liability also
attaches when a negligently manufactured component part has been
incorporated into fixtures on real property. The moral of this for
manufacturers of component parts for reactors and for other building
contractors in the atomic business is apparent.
Moreover, under current court decisions we must take note of the
adoption of limited areas of absolute liability of product manufacturers, as in the case of manufacturers of food, drugs, and similar arti38. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
39. Id. at 1053.
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cles intended for human consumption. Very recently this doctrine has
been extended into other areas. For example in Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc. 40 the plaintiff who had had her hair dyed by a beautician
with disastrous results sued the distributor of the hair dye which
caused her injury. The court held that, as in the case of food products,
failure to prove negligence was no bar to recovery.
What will be the result in the case of the manufacturer of articles
containing radioactive substances? Such substances may, of course,
be used for human ingestion in medical diagnosis or therapy, and
therefore will be already included in the field of strict liability. But
in any case even though no ingestion is involved, since the tendency is
to extend the law to eliminate the requirement of proof of negligence,
especially in connection with articles that are likely to cause harm to
users, it may well come about that the manufacturer of radioactive
articles will be held in all instances to the absolute liability which is
now being applied in the food and drug cases.
Furthermore, the giving of evidentiary effect to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur becomes of significance. This doctrine places the
burden of proof on the defendant to prove that he exercised all reasonable care, once a prima facie case has been made by showing
circumstances from which negligence will be presumed in the absence
of proof to the contrary.
Finally we find an ever-widening imposition of a duty to warn the
public of the dangers inherent in manufactured products, as a result
of which the manufacturer does not stand much chance against the
injured person who hails him into court.
In the field of manufactured products for use in atomic activities all
of these juristic developments are surely going to make themselves
felt, and manufacturers of such devices are going to be required to
exercise extraordinary care to insure or otherwise protect themselves
against possibilities of having to pay for damages suffered by remote
purchasers or users of their products or even by innocent bystanders.
SOiE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING TORT LIABILITY FOR
RADIATION INJURIES IN COMiVION LAW COUNTRIES

The foregoing analysis leads to certain conclusions concerning tort
liability for radiation injuries that can now be briefly stated as follows:
1. Available legal theories do not provide us with clear-cut answers
to the difficult questions that will be presented by radiation overexposure. A reactor containing critical quantities of uranium is relatively more dangerous than a cobalt 60 radiography capsule, and
the latter is more of a hazard than a radioisotope thickness guage.
40. 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
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What fissionable materials and radioisotopes are to be regarded as
"dangerous substances" likely to "cause mischief" if they escape?
Which are "ultrahazardous"? Which are "non-natural uses" on the
one hand, or "matters of common usage" on the other? Which are of
such great social or economic significance that they should be encouraged, and which are otherwise? These are difficult questions that can
be answered only as the law slowly pricks out the boundary lines by
the careful process of case by case decision. Unless all atomic uses are
to be cast into a single mold and made either subject to strict liability
or to negligence doctrines, these lines must be drawn, placing instances
of strict liability on one side and cases to be decided by negligence on
the other. Yet common law methods afford but little assistance in
drawing this line.
2. Since we can begin to envisage the problems that are likely to
emerge and readily recognize the need of prompt and definitive disposition of them, we should give serious consideration to expediting
the process by legislative means, thus giving the effective solution
needed to afford reasonable assurance to a new and useful facility.
3. Countries with civil codes are giving the matter a substantial
amount of attention at the present time. In West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, and, indeed, all of the countries in Euratom
and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, studies are
in progress seeking to resolve the difficulties by the adoption of appropriate legislation. It seems altogether likely that in the United States
we shall be best served if we proceed likewise and get into our statute
books appropriate legislation drawing the lines and stating the conditions of liability.
STATUTES AND PROPOSED STATUTES DEALING WITH
LIABILITY FOR RADIATION INJURIES

Statutes dealing with tort liability are no novelty in contemporary
legislation. The example which comes first to mind is the workmen's
compensation legislation almost universally enacted in this country.
Other statutes dealing with their respective fields are the Federal
Safety Appliance Act applicable to interstate railroads, the Pure Food
and Drug Acts imposing liability upon manufacturers or sellers of
defective foods or drugs, and the Aeronautic Acts of the several states.
There is good reason to believe that, in due course, radiation injuries
will also be covered by appropriate legislation, for such legislation
could readily be drafted to clarify the lines of demarcation between
strict liability and liability for negligence only, thus removing the
uncertainties of the judge-made law. To date the problem has been
given far more attention in England and on the Continent of Europe
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than it has in the United States. It will be worth our while to examine
foreign developments.
It is in England, the country of origin of Rylands v. Fletcher, that
the most positive and sweeping legislation has been placed in effect.
The Parliament of the United Kingdom in adopting its Atomic Energy
Authority Act of 1954 made the Authority absolutely liable for all
radiation injuries not only from reactor operations but also from other
nuclear activities, by providing a section 5 (3) reading as follows:
It shall be the duty of the Authority to secure that no ionizing radiation
from anything on the premises occupied by them or from any waste discharged (in whatever form) on or from any premises occupied by them
cause any hurt to any person or any damage to any property whether he
or it is on such premises or elsewhere.
This section places the English Atomic Energy Authority under an
absolute duty which permits of no exceptions whatsoever, even for
acts of God. Moreover, the act covers all kinds of radioactivity both
that resulting from chain reactions and that from less dangerous
sources. Thus, the Authority in Britain is under an exceptionally
broad duty to see that their reactors and all other atomic activities
are proof not only against the vicissitudes of normal operational activity but also against acts of God, falling airplanes, and mishandling
by strangers. Finally, the Authority's liability is without financial
limit.41
It should be noted, however, that section 5 (3) applies only to the
Atomic Energy Authority, namely the British government agency.
It does not apply to private industry. At the present time such industry
is not extensively engaged in England in atomic operations, but it
doubtless will be so engaged in the near future. If accidents take
place, the common law doctrines, including Rylands v. Fletcher,
would then be controlling, unless in the meantime parliamentary
legislation is enacted.
But Parliament is about to act. On February 10, 1958, the British
government announced its intention to introduce legislation providing
for the licensing and inspection of all privately owned atomic energy
operations, announcing, further, that all such private owners would
be subject to the same duty as that of the Atomic Energy Authority
with respect to the prevention of damage and the obligation to make
recompense for personal injury or property damage occasioned by
41. See discussion by C. J. Highton, General Counsel for the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority, in a paper entitled InternationalProblems of Tort
Liability and FinancialProtection Arising Out of the Use of Atomic EnergyLaw Relating to Atomic Operations in Great Britain presented to the International Bar Association Convention, Cologne, Germany, July 21, 1958. See
also Highton, The Legal Aspects of the Development of Atomic Energy in the
United Kingdom, 12 VAND. L. REV. 223 (1958).
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their operations. In other words, the British do not seem to feel that
Rylands v. Fletcher is adequate for atomic energy purposes, and they
intend to provide a very comprehensive strict liability measure covering all atomic operations, government, private, and otherwise. There
is some uncertainty at the present time as to whether or not the act
to be applied to private industry would require strict liability for
escaping radioisotopes as distinguished from chain reactions. A high
government official has indicated that he does not believe the act in
its final form will be quite so drastic. In any case this proposed measure represents the current thinking in the land of origin of the common law-one of the principal competitors for the world's atomic
business in the future.
In Germany also the matter of liabiilty for atomic injuries has
recently received extensive and intensive consideration. As early as
1955 German lawyers and insurance experts were studying the
liability problems likely to arise from peaceful uses of atomic energy.
As a result of these deliberations a draft of a Federal Atomic Energy
Act was prepared. In 1957 this draft was ready for adoption, but
because of political obstacles final action was deferred. In the meantime several of the West German Lander having research reactors
operating or under construction have investigated the matter, and in
January 1958, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen adopted a measure that
included in interim treatment of civil liability and insurance coverage
therefor.
The 1957 German draft bill as proposed by the government of the
Federal Republic of West Germany contains an exceptionally thoughtful treatment of the question of liability. Under this measure if damage is caused to persons or property as a result of defective operation
of any nuclear fission process or of radiation from a radioactive substance emitted from any installation involving a critical mass of
fissionable material, the owner of the plant becomes absolutely liable
for all damages, except in cases arising from acts of God. On the other
hand, in cases of injury from other radioactive substances the owner
can exculpate himself from liability by proving that he has used
"every precaution possible under the circumstances." This is in
effect a negligence doctrine with an inversed burden of proof. The
provision for the inversion of the burden of proof is not, however,
made applicable to physicians or dentists who are especially favored
by reason of following the usual practice of placing the burden on
the plaintiff.
The draft also provides limits upon maximum liability; in case of
death a maximum f DM 100,000 is included; or, in case of incapacitating injury, a yearly payment not to exceed DM 6,000. The total amount
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for any one accident shall not exceed DM 15,000,000, except in the
case of negligence for which there is no limit.
The draft also would revise the statutes of limitation to make them
more realistic in view of the peculiar nature of radiation injuries
especially the length of time between overexposure and the delayed
incidence of cancer, cataract, leukemiA, and other characteristic
afflictions.42
A somewhat similar measure is being currently drafted in Switzerland where the matter has been under careful study since 1954. The
second draft of this measure was completed by the commission in
charge on May 6, 1958, and it is now ready for submission to the
Swiss Parliament. This draft also provides for absolute liability for
activities involving chain reactions of fissionable material. A maxi43
mum limit upon liability is set at S.Fr. 30,000,000.
These German and Swiss bills are almost certain to become law
in their respective countries within the next year unless the present
thinking in regard to the subject is changed by the drafts currently
being prepared by two important international organizations, namely
Euratom and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
The insurance companies of the six countries forming Euratom have
created an ad hoc Working Group under the chairmanship of Professor J. Basyn of the "Institut Sup~rieur de Commerce" of Antwerp.
This group has prepared a draft for a proposed international convention concerning third-party liability for radiation injuries.44 It is also
reported that the OEEC has prepared a draft of a general liability
law. This draft is not yet available but it will be released in the near
future and will probably affect developments in many of the countries
that participate in that organization.
These drafts have value to interested persons in the United States,
for they point the way toward a solution of the civil liability problem
by statutory prescription of absolute liability in its proper field, with
reasonably clear-cut definitions and appropriately worded exceptions.
Of special importance is the handling of the chain reaction activities,
making them subject to strict liability, but leaving other radioactive
activity subject to the normal principles of negligence. Such statutes,
if they become law, will establish an orderly system of liability for
radiation injuries substituting for the present unsatisfactory state of
42. The original draft of this measure was submitted to the Bundestag in
a report dated May 9, 1957 (Paper 3502) as a result of the deliberations of
the 38th Parliament Commission on Atomic Questions. A revised version,
translated into English by Centre d'Etudes de la Commission Permanente du
Risque Atomique (CERA) can be found in Information Bulletin No. 12,
July, 1958.
43. The draft Swiss Federal Law may also be found in translated form
in Information Bulletin No. 12 of CERA.

44. Ibid.
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affairs under judge-made law. They can and should provide a system
of redress for injured persons based upon careful legislative appraisals
of the entire field rather than the details of single cases. Such appraisals can take account of economic and social needs as well as justice to
the individual and the problems of a new and valuable industry.

